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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates whether individuals feel worse off when others around them earn more. In
other words, do people care about relative position and does "lagging behind the Joneses" diminish
well-being? To answer this question, I match individual-level panel data containing a number of
indicators of well-being to information about local average earnings. I find that, controlling for an
individual's own income, higher earnings of neighbors are associated with lower levels of self-
reported happiness. The data's panel nature and rich set of measures of well-being and behavior
indicate that this association is not driven by selection or by changes in the way people define
happiness. There is suggestive evidence that the negative effect of increases in neighbors' earnings
on own well-being is most likely caused by interpersonal preferences, i.e. people having utility
functions that depend on relative consumption in addition to absolute consumption.
Erzo F.P. Luttmer





1.  Introduction 
 
Classical economists understood that individuals are motivated at least partly by concerns 
about relative position.  Adam Smith (1759), for example, wrote: “Nothing is so mortifying as to 
be obliged to expose our distress to the view of the public, and to feel, that though our situation 
is open to the eyes of all mankind, no mortal conceives for us the half of what we suffer.  Nay, it 
is chiefly from this regard to the sentiments of mankind, that we pursue riches and avoid 
poverty.”  Arthur Pigou (1920) approvingly quotes John Stuart Mill’s observation that “men do 
not desire to be rich, but richer than other men.”
1  Of course, the belief that people may compare 
themselves to others around them goes back much further.  After all, the framer of the Ten 
Commandments apparently judged it necessary to forbid humans from coveting their neighbor’s 
possessions.  Not all humans, however, appear to abide by this Commandment and possible 
effects of social comparisons on consumption and savings behavior are analyzed in the classic 
works of Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949).  
Though contemporary economists are aware that individuals may care about relative 
position, the accepted mainstream model states that individuals derive utility from their own 
consumption, U(C), rather than from a combination of own and relative consumption, U(C, 
C/C ), where C  denotes some measure of the consumption of relevant others.
2  For many 
applications it does not matter whether utility has a relative component; whenever C  is fixed or 
given, U(C) and U(C, C/C ) are isomorphic.  Indeed, unless an individual’s behavior can affect 
                                                 
1 This is quoted in Graham and Pettinato (2002).  
2 Becker (1974) introduces a more general framework for incorporating social considerations into a utility function.  
C need not be the simple average of the consumption of relevant others, but could be some weighted average with 
the weight depending on the similarity of the respondent to the other person or on the level of consumption of the 
other person.   2
C , U(C) and U(C, C/C ) cannot be distinguished by individual behavior without placing 
additional structure on the utility function.
3  In light of this, it is perhaps not surprising that most 
economists tend to rely on an absolute formulation of utility: U(C).   
  Whereas individuals may in many cases take C  as given, policy decisions often affect 
C .  Hence, the distinction between absolute and relative formulations of utility has important 
implications for tax and expenditure policy, as analyzed by Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), 
Layard (1980), Oswald (1983), Ng (1987), Seidman (1987), Ireland (1998), Ljungqvist and 
Uhlig (2000) and Abel (2003).  In particular, if utility depends on relative consumption, one 
person’s increase in consumption has a negative externality on others because it lowers the 
relative consumption of others.  In this case, taxes that discourage consumption are not as 
distortionary as previously thought because they also serve to internalize the negative externality 
of consumption on others. 
  When utility depends on one’s consumption relative to nearby others, residential sorting 
by consumption level will reduce inequality of utility because people will compare themselves 
with others more like themselves.  Comparing oneself to similar others reduces inequality in 
perceived relative position, which is one component of inequality of utility.  If utility is linear in 
relative consumption and additive in absolute and relative consumption, then residential sorting 
by consumption level does not affect average utility, but for other functional forms it can 
increase or decrease average utility.  Thus, when people care about relative position, the degree 
                                                 
3 A structure that specifies that relative concerns are more important for some goods (e.g. present consumption or 
luxury consumption items) than for other goods (e.g. leisure or future consumption) yields behavioral implications.  
See, for example, Pollak (1976) or Frank (1985).  As Dupor and Liu (2003) make clear, if the consumption of others 
affects own marginal utility rather the level of own utility, the consumption of others can influence asset pricing, 
risk taking, savings, intensity of job search, work effort, economic growth and income inequality.  See, e.g., Abel 
(1990), Robson (1992), Galí (1994), Carroll, Overland and Weil (1997), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Stutzer and 
Lalive (2001), Becker, Murphy and Werning (2003) and Zeckhauser and Rizzo (2003).   3
of residential sorting has direct effects on the distribution of well-being in addition to the indirect 
effects usually identified (e.g. due to the financing of local public goods). 
The distinction between relative and absolute formulations of utility is also pertinent to 
the longstanding debate on whether the poverty line should be absolute (a fixed consumption 
basket), as it is in the U.S. and in many developing countries, or relative (a fraction of mean or 
median income), as it is in much of Europe (Sen, 1983).  It also matters for the question whether 
increases in inequality due to a rise in the top incomes are a matter of policy concern.  Feldstein 
(1998), for example, argues forcefully that only poverty, not increases in inequality due to 
increased top incomes, warrant policy attention because the latter is a pure Pareto improvement 
under the assumption that people only derive utility from their own consumption.  He notes that 
this argument would not hold for “spiteful egalitarians,” or people who say “It makes me worse 
off to see the rich getting richer.”  While one may reject spiteful egalitarianism on moral grounds 
(and therefore use a paternalistic argument to exclude this spiteful utility component from any 
social welfare function), it is an empirical question to determine whether people actually suffer 
from this affliction.  In other words, do people actually feel worse off when those around them 
are richer?
4  
  This paper tries to answer that question and finds evidence of “spiteful egalitarianism.”  I 
use panel data on individuals’ self-reported happiness, other measures of well-being and other 
characteristics from the 1987-88 and the 1992-94 waves of the National Survey of Families and 
Households (NSFH).  I match this data to information on local earnings, where localities are so-
called Public Use Microdata Areas (“PUMAs”), which have about 150,000 inhabitants on 
average.  Average annual earnings in each PUMA are estimated by applying national earnings by 
                                                 
4 Samuelson (2004) and Rayo and Becker (2004) offer evolutionary explanations of relative consumption effects. 
Postewaite (1998) discusses the advantages and drawbacks of modeling relative position as an argument of the 
utility function rather than as an instrument to getting more own consumption in the future.   4
industry, occupation and year from the Current Population Survey to the industry and occupation 
mix of that PUMA from the 1990 Census five percent Public Use Micro Sample.  I find that 
higher PUMA-level earnings are associated with lower levels of happiness, controlling for a host 
of individual characteristics including income.
5  This effect is large, robust to changes in 
specification and highly statistically significant.  An increase in neighbors’ earnings and a 
similarly sized decrease in own income each lead to a reduction in happiness of about the same 
order of magnitude. 
  This paper builds on previous papers that have empirically examined the relationship 
between relative position and well-being.
6  In a series of papers, Easterlin (1974, 1995 and 2001) 
notes that income and self-reported happiness are positively correlated across individuals within 
a country but that average happiness within countries does not seem to rise over time as countries 
become richer.  Easterlin interprets these findings as evidence that relative income rather than the 
level of income matters for well-being.  Veenhoven (1991) and Diener et al. (1993) show that 
happiness is not purely a relative concept, but they cannot rule out that concerns about relative 
position matter.  Van de Stadt, Kapteyn and Van de Geer (1985) find that the income level that 
respondents say they need to reach a certain level of satisfaction rises both with own income and 
with income in one’s reference group as defined by education and age.  They interpret this as 
                                                 
5 Though, at a conceptual level, relative consumption rather than relative income or earnings affects well-being, I 
use measures of earnings and income as proxies for consumption in the empirical section because of data 
availability.   
6 Frey and Stutzer (2002) provide an excellent review of this literature.  Layard (2003) also discusses much of this 
literature as part of his engaging Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures on happiness. Relative position may affect 
outcome variables other than subjective well-being.  Clark and Oswald (1996) show evidence on job satisfaction 
while Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) and Bowles and Park (2002) relate it to labor supply decisions.  There is a 
long literature on the effects of inequality on health outcomes.  Deaton (2003) surveys this literature and concludes 
that the evidence on the relation between income inequality and health needs to be treated skeptically though he 
believes there is convincing biological evidence that increases in rank can be protective of health.  Eibner and Evans 
(2001) find evidence for the U.S. that relative deprivation (which is a measure of rank and the income gap with 
those who are richer) increases mortality.  Similarly, local variables other than income may affect well-being.  Clark 
(2003) finds effects of local unemployment on happiness that may be explained by concerns about relative position.  
Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2001) investigate how inequality affects well-being and, intriguingly, find 
negative effects in Europe but not in the U.S.   5
evidence that utility is (partly) relative, but the findings could also be driven by reference group 
income proxying for poorly measured own income.
7  Using a self-reported measure of relative 
position, Graham and Pettinato (2002) find suggestive evidence in developing countries that 
well-being is influenced by relative income concerns though their measure of relative position 
might also proxy for own income. 
Using Canadian data, Tomes (1986) relates self-reported happiness and life-satisfaction 
to own income and income in the local community.  In a number of specifications, he finds that 
increases in income in certain parts of the community income distribution reduce well-being and 
he concludes that his “results support the interdependent preferences model, but defy any simple 
characterization in terms of inequality aversion or relative economic status.”  Using the German 
Socio-Economic Panel, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) finds compelling evidence that, controlling for 
own income, subjective well-being is decreasing in income of the reference group defined by 
education × age × region cells where region is East or West Germany.  Stutzer (2004) shows that 
self-reported happiness of Swiss individuals depends negatively on income aspirations when 
own income is held constant.  Income aspirations, in turn, depend positively on the average 
income in one’s community, thus providing a mechanism by which average local income reduces 
self-reported happiness.  Using U.S. data, McBride (2001) and Oswald and Clark (2004) both 
find tantalizing evidence that relative income affects subjective well-being but they caution about 
the statistical reliability of their findings.
8 
                                                 
7 Van Praag and Kapteyn (1973) found previously that income needed to reach a certain level of satisfaction rises 
with own income and interpret this as “preference drift,” or evidence of habit formation.  See Van Praag and Frijters 
(1999) for more details on the approach to measuring welfare using income need questions. 
8 Using a sample of 324 individuals from the General Social Survey, McBride (2001) finds that, controlling for own 
income, self-reported happiness depends negatively on the average income in one’s age cohort defined as those 
within 5 years of the respondent’s age though this effect is only just significant at the 5% level in one of his two 
specifications and not significant in the other. Oswald and Clark (2004) find that, controlling for own income, there 
is a sizeable but statistically insignificant negative effect of per capita state income on self-reported happiness, 
providing suggestive evidence that individuals care about relative position. They also find that relative income   6
This paper contributes in three ways to this literature.  First, it takes seriously the concern 
that living in a prosperous area might affect one’s definition of happiness even if it does not 
affect one’s true or experienced well-being.  I use other outcome measures that are less prone to 
definition shifts in response to neighbors’ earnings to investigate this concern and conclude that 
this concern is not driving the results.   
Second, the paper examines whether the inverse relationship between happiness and 
neighbors’ earnings might be spurious due to omitted individual or local characteristics.  The 
panel nature of the NSFH data enables me to run specifications with individual fixed effects, its 
detailed geographical information allows for the inclusion of state×time-specific fixed effects, 
and the use of a predicted measure of local earnings filters out many local earnings shocks 
caused by unobserved local factors that might simultaneously influence happiness.  The results 
hold up under these specifications, reducing the concern that they are due to omitted variable 
bias.   
Third, the paper offers suggestive evidence concerning the mechanism mediating the 
negative relationship neighbors’ earnings and happiness.  Is it a psychological externality of the 
form U(C, C/C ) as laid out above? Or might there be market interactions (e.g. in the housing 
market) that give rise to this pattern?  In contrast to what one would expect if the findings were 
driven by effects in local housing markets, I find no evidence that there is any difference in the 
effect for renters and owners.  Yet, I do find evidence that the results are stronger for people who 
socialize more with neighbors but not for those who socialize more with friends outside the 
neighborhood.  I also find that the effects on happiness are mostly driven by changes in one’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
enters significantly if entered as household income per capita / state income per capita.  However, because this 
regression controls for the log of household income per capita rather than the level of household income per capita, 
the relative income term may be significant because it offers an alternative functional form for own household 
income and not because of variation in state income per capita.     7
satisfaction with one’s material position (e.g. one’s financial situation) rather than changes with 
one’s satisfaction with other aspects of life (e.g. one’s family life).  Finally, individuals’ 
happiness decreases if neighbors with the same educational attainment earn more but hardly 
responds to earnings of neighbors with different levels of educational attainment. Together, these 
findings indicate that interpersonal preferences that incorporate relative income concerns, rather 




2. Empirical Strategy 
 
  Can data on behavior reveal whether people’s well-being is affected by the incomes of 
others around them?  Unless one assumes that neighbors’ incomes affect an individual’s 
marginal utility of other goods, the only behavior affected is the individual’s choice of reference 
group implicit in the decision where to locate.
9  Individuals’ concerns about relative position 
might then be capitalized in house prices with houses in high-income neighborhoods costing 
relatively less than similar houses in low-income neighborhoods because a homeowner in a rich 
neighborhood needs to be compensated for being relatively poor.
10  This prediction, of course, 
only holds if individuals are both (i) aware that their utility depends on relative position and (ii) 
correctly forecast the utility effect of the change in reference group associated with moving.  
                                                 
9 See, Falk and Knell (2003) for evidence on reference groups choices from a questionnaire study. 
10 This prediction is derived from Frank’s (1984) model in which he analyzes the effects of relative income concerns 
on wage distributions.  He assumes that the reference group consists of coworkers and deduces that a worker in firm 
with highly productive (and highly paid) workers must be paid more than a similar worker in a low productivity firm 
because the worker needs to be compensated for the utility loss of being a relatively low earner if he joins the firm 
with the high earners.   8
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) describe a number of experiments that show 
systematic biases in individuals’ predictions of their future utility.  With respect to endogenous 
reference groups, they note that  “when people make decisions that cause their comparison 
groups to change – such as switching jobs or buying a house in a new neighborhood – projection 
bias predicts that people will underappreciate the effects of a change in comparison groups and 
hence, consistent with Smith’s assertion, overestimate the long-term satisfaction that would 
accompany such a change.  As a result, people may be prone to make reference-group-changing 
decisions that give them a sensation of status relative to their current reference group.  If a 
person buys a small house in a wealthy neighborhood in part because it has a certain status 
value in her apartment building, she may not fully appreciate that her frame of references may 
quickly become the larger houses and bigger cars that her new neighbors have.”  These 
considerations make credible identification of relative income concerns from mobility decisions 
or housing price information very challenging. 
  The identification of relative income concerns therefore probably falls in the limited set 
of research questions for which one needs to turn to a proxy for utility to answer it (see, Di Tella 
et al., 2001, Gruber and Mullainathan, 2002, or Frey et al., 2004, for other examples of such 
questions).
11  Though some skepticism towards self-reported measures of well-being is 
warranted (see, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, and Ravallion and Lokshin, 2001), there is 
ample psychological evidence that confirms the validity and reliability of self-reported happiness 
as a measure of well-being (see, e.g. Kahneman, 1999).  Frey and Stutzer (2002) therefore 
conclude that “the existing research suggests that, for many purposes, happiness or reported 
subjective well-being is a satisfactory empirical approximation to individual utility”  
                                                 
11 Zeckhauser (1991), Solnick and Hemenway (1998) and Johansson-Stenman (2002) find evidence for positional 
concerns by asking subjects to make choices over hypothetic scenarios with different levels of absolute and relative 
income.   9
To determine whether well-being depends partly on relative income concerns, one might 
then estimate an equation of the form:
12  
(1)  self-reported well-being = f(own income, average income in locality, controls) 
To make the discussion of the empirical strategy more concrete, a very basic linear OLS 
regression with self-reported happiness (on a 1-7 scale) as the outcome variable yields a 
coefficient of 0.20 (s.e. of 0.014) on log own household income and a coefficient of -0.20 (s.e. of 
0.04) on log average per capita income in one’s locality (PUMA).
13  This regression previews the 
general findings of the more elaborate regressions presented in detail in the results section below.  
Can this finding of a negative coefficient on average income in locality (and a positive one on 
own income) be interpreted as evidence that utility is at least partly determined by relative 
income?  Or are there plausible alternative stories that could give rise to the same result even if 
utility is purely a function of own income?  Below, I discuss the three most serious threats to a 
causal interpretation of the coefficient on average income in locality and consider ways of testing 
them. 
  The first alternative story is that the definition of happiness shifts: people answer the 
question about their happiness in relative rather than absolute terms (Tversky and Griffin, 1991, 
and Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999).
14  In this case, self-reported happiness would be a proxy 
for relative experienced well-being rather than absolute experienced well-being.  Suppose, for 
example, that each individual’s experienced well-being, Ui, is equal to her income, Yi, and that 
individuals are asked whether they are happy or not.  Individuals now face the task of translating 
                                                 
12 I enter average income in locality separately in this specification rather than in form of the ratio of own income to 
average income in locality.  I do this because, in practice, I have a number of proxies for own income instead of a 
single measure. 
13 For simplicity, no other controls are included in this illustrative regression.  Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the PUMA level.  
14 King et al. (2004) explain how vignettes can be used to anchor the scale of subjective questions thereby making 
the answers comparable across people.  No such vignettes, however, were used in the NSFH.   10
experienced well-being into an answer to this question.  If people respond that they are happy 
whenever Ui exceeds some fixed (but possibly individual-specific) cutoff value, then they answer 
the question in absolute terms.  In this case, an increase of everyone’s income by the same factor 
would increase the fraction of people answering they are happy.  However, if people respond that 
they are happy whenever their Ui exceeds some cutoff value that is a function of the population 
distribution of Ui (such a the mean or median Ui), they are answering the question in relative 
terms.  In this case, an increase of everyone’s income by the same factor may not affect the 
proportion of individuals answering that they are happy even though every individual’s 
experienced utility is higher.
15  I address this concern by using alternative indicators of well-
being that have a relatively objective definition, such as the frequency of financial worries or the 
frequency of marital disagreements.   
  The second alternative story is that the results are driven by unobserved local area 
characteristics that are both correlated with average local income and self-reported happiness.  
One might expect most of this type of omitted variable bias to go in the other direction; e.g., one 
would expect higher income areas to have less crime, better local schools and other positive 
amenities that raise happiness.  The concern about local omitted variables driving the result is 
addressed in three ways.  First, if the results hold up after inclusion of state×time fixed effects, 
they cannot be driven by unobservables that operate at that level, such as climate, state policies, 
or regional shocks.  Second, one may be concerned that local incomes just proxy for the local 
price level.  Thus, conditional on nominal income, an individual living in a high-income area 
would face higher prices and thus have less real income, reducing happiness.
16  However, if we 
                                                 
15 This is also a potential explanation for the findings in a number of studies that levels of self-reported happiness or 
life satisfaction remain remarkably constant in a country over time even as incomes rise. See, e.g. Easterlin (1974). 
16 Note however that if higher price levels reflect positive local amenities, they do not reduce real income; in effect, 
the individual is purchasing the local amenity by locating in an expensive area.  This means that only unobserved   11
control for real income instead, there is no longer a role for local area incomes to proxy for local 
price levels, and any negative effect of local income on happiness cannot be explained by this 
price level story.  To control for real income, I include only those individual controls that do not 
vary with local prices.  This excludes nominal earnings and home value, but still includes 
education, age, and average national earnings for someone in the same industry and occupation 
as the respondent.  Third, instead of using actual local income, I use a predicted measure of local 
earnings.  The predictor is based on the industry×occupation composition of the locality at one 
point in time (1990) and national industry×occupation earnings trends (excluding data from 
one’s own state).
17  Thus, predicted local earnings vary across areas for two reasons: (i) the 
industry×occupation mix at a point in time, which we can control for using area fixed effects, 
and (ii) national earnings trends by industry and occupation, which we have no reason to believe 
to be correlated with unobserved local shocks.  This predictor therefore filters out any local 
shocks (such as quality of local government) that may both affect local incomes and happiness.  I 
refer to this measure as LnPumaEarnings or more informally as neighbors’ earnings and use it as 
the measure of local earnings throughout this paper unless otherwise noted.  The use of predicted 
local earnings, however, does not rule out that higher local earnings affect an unobserved local 
variable, which in turn reduces happiness.  Two obvious candidates for such unobserved 
variables are quality of local schooling and changes to the housing market.  If this is the case, we 
expect to see different effects by homeownership and by presence of children in the household.  
                                                                                                                                                             
variation in local prices due to transportation cost or local production costs could possibly explain the findings.  
Since we can control for state×time fixed effects, the transportation or production cost differences should be within 
states to explain away the results.  The scope for such variation is considerably less than the scope of transportation 
and production cost differences in the nation as a whole. 
17 This predictor follows similar predictors used by Bartik (1991), Blanchard and Katz (1992), Bound and Holzer 
(2000) and Autor and Duggan (2003).   See appendix B for details on the construction of this predictor.   12
  The third story is that the results are driven by omitted individual characteristics that 
influence both the decision where to live and self-reported happiness.  In particular, selection of 
individuals with unobservables that make them relatively happy (or relatively likely to report 
being happy) into localities with relatively low incomes would also result in a negative 
coefficient on average income in locality.  Though one might expect that most selection would 
go in the opposite direction (high income in one’s locality proxying for higher unobserved own 
income), there could be selection effects that lead to a spurious negative effect of average 
income in locality.  For example, individuals receiving an inheritance may be relatively unhappy 
(because of the unobserved death of a relative) but able to move to a relatively high-income 
locality, or intrinsically happy people might be better able to deal with the rougher aspects of 
low-income areas thus selecting to live there.  This paper exploits the panel aspect of the NSFH 
data to deal with this concern.  If, after inclusion of individual fixed effects, average income in 
the locality still matters, then we know that time-invariant unobserved individual characteristics 
cannot be driving the results. 
  To preserve statistical power, the baseline specification to test for relative income 
concerns is a pooled cross-section OLS regression of the form: 
(2)  Happinessipt = LnPumaEarningspt β1 + Xit β2 + wavet β3  + εipt 
where i indexes individuals, p indexes PUMAs, and t indexes the wave of the survey.  In the 
baseline specification, Happiness is self-reported happiness (measured on a seven-point scale), 
but other correlates of well-being are used in alternative specifications.  LnPumaEarnings are 
average predicted earnings in the PUMA of the respondent where the prediction is based on the 
PUMA’s industry×occupation composition and national earnings trends.  The vector Xit is a set 
of individual-specific controls that include a number of proxies for income as well as basic   13
demographics.  Finally, wavet is a dummy for the wave of the survey and εipt is an error term that 
may be clustered within PUMAs.  If individuals derive utility in part from relative position, we 
would expect β1 to be negative.  
  The baseline sample consists of individuals who are married or cohabitating in both 
waves of the NSFH.  I limit the sample to married or cohabiting individuals for two reasons.  
First, for these observations, we also have information about spouses or interactions with one’s 
spouse, which are useful in a number of further tests of the baseline results.  Second, it turns out 
that married individuals drive the baseline results, though neighbors’ earnings still have a 
negative and significant effect on happiness in the full sample that includes non-married 
individuals. 
  Since most questions are asked of both the main respondent and his or her spouse, it 
makes sense to also exploit the spousal information.  Adding the spousal information as a 
separate observation to the regression may bias standard errors downwards because the error 
term of the respondent and the error term of his or her spouse are likely to be correlated.
18 
Instead, I average the values of the individual level variables for the main respondent and his or 
her spouse, and enter those as a single observation in the regression.  I thus do not exploit intra-
household level variation, but this does not matter since the main explanatory variables of 
interest (neighbors’ earnings and own household income) do not vary within households. 
  In the results section, I will present various modifications of this baseline regression to 
investigate whether the baseline results are spurious, whether they are robust, and what 
mechanisms drive them.  These modifications will be explained in detail later and include adding 
                                                 
18 I already cluster at the PUMA level (the level at which neighbors’ earnings vary), and therefore cannot easily 
cluster at the household level at the same time.    14
individual fixed effects, adding state×wave fixed effects, exploring other outcome or control 





National Survey of Families and Households 
  The data on subjective well-being as well as the individual-level control variables come 
from the National Survey of Families and Households.
19  The NSFH consists of a nationally 
representative sample of individuals, age 19 or older (unless married or living in a household 
with no one age 19 or older), living in households, and able to speak English or Spanish.  The 
first wave of interviews took place in 1987-88 and a second wave of interviews took place in 
1992-94.  Though the questionnaires are not identical in both waves, many questions were asked 
twice making it possible to treat the data as a panel of about 10,000 individuals.  What makes 
this dataset particularly well-suited for this paper is that, in addition to being a panel with both 
measures of well-being and extensive demographic information, it can be merged with detailed 
geographic information.  The respondents of the baseline sample live in 580 separate Public Use 
Microdata Areas in the first wave, in 965 PUMAs in the second wave, while 555 PUMAs have 
respondents living there in both waves (more about the definition of PUMAs later).   
  The main outcome variable is self-reported happiness, which is the answer to the 
question: “Next are some questions about how you see yourself and your life.  First taking things 
all together, how would you say things are these days?”  Respondents answer on a seven-point 
                                                 
19 The NSFH is a survey that was primarily designed for demographers interested in family and household issues.  
More information on the NSFH can be found in Sweet, Bumpass and Call (1988), in Sweet and Bumpass (1996) or 
at the NSFH website: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/nsfh/home.htm   15
scale where 1 is defined as “very unhappy,”  7 is defined as “very happy” but intermediate values 
are not explicitly defined.  Other measures of well-being include the frequency of financial 
worries, the frequency of open disagreements with one’s spouse on a number of topics, items 
from Lenore Radloff’s (1977) depression scale, and, only in the second wave, self-reported 
satisfaction with various aspects of one’s life.  Detailed descriptions of these variables are 
included in appendix A.  
  The individual-level controls in the baseline specification consist of income proxies, 
labor market variables, demographic characteristics and religious affiliation.  The main income 
variable is log household income while log value of the home and a dummy for being a renter 
may also proxy for own income.  Any missing values are dummied out as are logarithms of any 
dollar amounts smaller than $100/year.
20  The demographic controls consist of gender, a set of 4 
race/ethnicity dummies, log household size, and a 3-segment spline in age (breakpoints at 35 and 
60). Religious affiliation is controlled for by 12 dummy variables. 
 
Census and Current Population Survey 
  The smallest geographical area in the 1990 Census 5% Public Use Micro Sample 
(PUMS) is the so-called Public Use Microdata Area.  PUMAs consist of neighborhoods, towns 
or counties aggregated up, or subdivided, until they contain at least 100,000 inhabitants.  In 
1990, there were 1726 PUMAs in the U.S. and the median and mean size of a PUMA was 
respectively 127,000 and 144,000 inhabitants.  The 1990 Census microdata are used to estimate 
the 3-digit industry × 3-digit occupation composition of each PUMA, which is later used to 
predict PUMA earnings.  In addition, I use the Census to estimate average 1989 earnings for 
each PUMA, which will serve as a check on the predictor. 
                                                 
20 All $ amounts are in real 1982-84 dollars using the CPI-U.     16
  I use the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) in the years 1987-88 and 1992-94 to estimate average earnings by 3-digit industry 
× 3-digit occupation cell in each of the two time periods when NSFH interviews took place.  For 
each PUMA, I calculate these average national earnings by time-period×industry×occupation 
cell excluding data from the state in which this PUMA lies. 
  Predicted PUMA earnings for each wave are formed by applying average national 
earnings by industry×occupation cell during that time period to each observation in the 
corresponding industry×occupation cell in the PUMA.  Details of this procedure are found in 






Column 1 of Table 1 shows the baseline specification in full.  This is a pooled cross-
section OLS regression of self-reported happiness on log predicted PUMA earnings and 
individual controls.  Individual level variables in this regression are averages of the main 
respondent and his or her spouse. Standard errors are corrected for clustered error terms at the 
PUMA level and the sample includes all NSFH respondents who are married or cohabiting in 
both waves.  The first row shows that, controlling for own income and other own characteristics, 
predicted PUMA earnings have a significantly negative effect on self-reported happiness.  In 
other words, individuals with richer neighbors report being less happy.  As expected, own 
household income has a positive effect on happiness but its coefficient may be relatively small   17
because the regression includes other proxies for income, such as the value of one’s home and a 
dummy variable for renting.
21  Usual working hours has an insignificant negative effect, 
unemployment status has a large and significant negative effect while a dummy for being out of 
the labor force has a significant positive effect on happiness.
22  The other demographic controls 
yield few surprising insights. 
Column 2 shows the same regression using only data from the main respondent rather 
than averaging the respondent’s data with that of the spouse.  This regression confirms that the 
results are not sensitive to the averaging procedure used in the baseline regression though power 
increases moderately when the data of the main respondent and the spouse are averaged.
23 
The coefficient on own household income in the baseline regression is likely biased 
downwards due to measurement error in income and the inclusion of other income proxies.  In 
specification 3, I try to get a more accurate estimate of the effect of own income by eliminating 
two other income proxies (home value and the dummy for renter) and by instrumenting log 
household income by the predicted household earnings, where the prediction based on the 
industry×occupation information of the respondent and the spouse and national earnings 
information (excluding the own state) by industry×occupation and time period from the CPS 
MORG.
24  Instrumenting results in an estimated effect of own household income on happiness 
that is about three times as large as the estimate in the baseline specification.  Moreover, the 
estimate is now larger than the absolute value of the estimate of neighbors’ earnings, though this 
difference is not statistically significant.  The point estimates imply that if both own income and 
                                                 
21 Ln Value of home has been demeaned. Hence, the dummy for renter is relative to a homeowner with a home of 
average value. 
22 Ln Usual working hours has been demeaned. Hence, the dummies for unemployment and out of the labor force 
are relative to an employed person working the average number of hours. 
23 I also stacked the data for the main respondent and the spouse, thus treating each as a separate observation in the 
regression.  This yields essentially the same coefficients but the standard errors are smaller than those of the baseline 
regression. 
24 See appendix B for details on the construction of this predictor.   18
neighbors’ earnings rise by the same percentage, a person would feel better off, indicating one’s 
absolute economic situation matters for happiness in addition to one’s relative position.  
 
Could the results be spurious? 
Table 2 investigates whether selection or omitted area characteristics could be driving the 
results.  The first row of Table 2 replicates the baseline regression. 
The second row includes individual-specific fixed effects, thus controlling for all time-
invariant individual characteristics.  The coefficient on neighbors’ earnings remains negative and 
similar in magnitude though it is now only significant at the 10% level.  This finding discounts 
the possibility that the cross-section results are driven by selection of people who are happier by 
nature into areas that are relatively poor.  Of course, this specification does not rule out selection 
based on unobserved time-variant characteristics.  The third row shows a regression that is 
identical to the baseline regression, except that a full set of state×wave fixed effects, a dummy 
for living in a metropolitan area and log metropolitan population size are added as controls.  
Both the coefficients on neighbors’ earnings and on own income change little and remain 
statistically significant.  Hence, the results are driven by variation in neighbors’ earnings within 
states at each point in time.  This specification thus rules out that the baseline results are spurious 
due to unobserved variables that operate at the state level or above, such as a poorer (southern) 
states having happier residents on average, for example because of unobserved better weather.  
One might worry that movers have something unobserved happen to them and that perhaps this 
unobserved factor causes the happiness to be inversely related to average neighbors’ earnings.  
The fourth row tests this by showing the baseline regression excluding all respondents who   19
moved to a different PUMA.  Again the coefficients on neighbors’ earnings and own income are 
hardly affected, showing that the baseline results are not just driven by movers.   
The regression in the fifth line is identical to the one in the fourth row, except that it 
includes individual fixed effects.  Because the sample is limited to non-movers, the individual 
fixed effects also serve as PUMA fixed effects (i.e., any PUMA fixed effects would be absorbed 
by the individual fixed effects).  Thus, the coefficient on neighbors’ income in this regression is 
purely identified off of changes in neighbors’ earnings that are solely due to different national 
trends in earnings in different industry×occupation cells.  The individual fixed effects absorb any 
time-invariant individual characteristics as well as any effect correlated with the 
industry×occupation composition of each PUMA.  Time-varying unobserved characteristics 
cannot affect one’s neighbors’ earnings because the sample is limited to non-movers.  
Unfortunately, the standard error in this specification is too large for this regression to provide 
any evidence on selection. 
Could neighbors’ earnings proxy for local price levels?  In this case, the negative 
coefficient on neighbors’ earnings would simply reflect that happiness falls as real incomes fall.  
Recall that neighbors’ earnings are measured by LnPumaEarnings, which is a predictor of local 
earnings based on the local industry×occupation mix but national earnings data (excluding data 
from one’s own state).  Hence, local price variation would only be picked up by 
LnPumaEarnings to the extent it is correlated with the local industry×occupation mix.  
Moreover, we saw in row 3 that the estimates are robust to the inclusion of state×wave fixed 
effects, implying that only local price variation within states at a point in time could possibly be 
driving the results.  Since migration within states is relatively easy, one would wonder what the 
source of such price variation is.  If higher prices merely reflect better local amenities (such as   20
better schools or less crime), one shouldn’t deflate incomes by local prices, because the higher 
local prices simply imply that one substitutes amenities for physical goods.  Thus, in that case, 
higher local prices should not reduce well-being.  On the other hand, if higher local prices reflect 
transportation costs or higher local production cost, local wages would need to rise 
proportionally to prevent an outflow of labor.  In this case, individuals in an area with high local 
prices would earn more but not be any better off than similar individuals in an area with low 
local prices.  Thus, if we don’t measure a respondent’s income by monetary variables (such as 
household income, home value) but instead use proxies that don’t respond to local wage levels 
(national earnings in the respondent’s industry ×occupation cell), then there would be no role for 
LnPumaEarnings to serve as a control for local prices.  Hence, the coefficient on 
LnPumaEarnings should become insignificant if it were just spuriously picking up local price 
variation.  The sixth row of table 2 estimates the baseline regression purged of any controls that 
proxy for the respondent’s nominal income.  The coefficient on LnPumaEarnings drops in size 
but remains negative and significant.  This rules out that  LnPumaEarnings is just picking up 
variation in local price levels. 
Table 3 investigates the robustness of the baseline results.  The first row again reproduces 
the baseline regression.  One might be concerned that the results are driven by the somewhat 
complicated procedure used to predict LnPumaEarnings.  The second row alleviates this 
concern; if anything, the estimate on LnPumaEarnings becomes more negative and more 
significant if we replace the predicted value by the actual value in 1989.  Similarly, the third row 
shows that using log PUMA income instead of earnings yields similar results. The fourth row 
runs the baseline regression on all the observations in the balanced panel (rather than only the 
ones married in both waves).  The coefficient on neighbors’ earnings remains highly significant,   21
but drops somewhat in magnitude, giving a first indication that the estimates are primarily driven 
by the married subsample.  This issue will be explored further in Table 7, discussed below.  
Could neighbors’ earnings proxy for non-linearities in the effect of own income?  This concern is 
ruled out by the fifth row, which shows that the estimate on neighbors’ earnings hardly changes 
after the inclusion of a 5
th-order polynomial in log household income.  Since the outcome 
variable, self-reported happiness, is ordinal rather than cardinal, an OLS regression may not be 
appropriate.  Specification six estimates the baseline regression using an ordered Probit and finds 
that the coefficient on neighbors’ earnings remains negative and highly significant.  Moreover, 
the ratio of the coefficient on neighbors’ earnings to the coefficient on own income remains 
roughly constant.
25  Finally, the seventh row shows that the results are insensitive to replacing 
log own household income by the couple’s log total earnings. 
 
Do neighbors’ earnings affect other outcomes?  
  Could an increase in neighbors’ earnings merely change what individuals define as happy 
rather than their true underlying well-being?  This concern is hard to rule out definitively, but 
using other outcome measures that may be less prone to shifts in definition yields some insights. 
  The first specification in Table 4 uses a measure of financial worries as an alternative 
outcome measure. If increases in neighbors’ earnings reduce happiness because one cannot 
afford the goods that neighbors consume, one would expect respondents to have more financial 
worries.  Financial worries are measured by the question “How often do you worry that your 
total family income will not be enough to meet your family’s expenses and bills?”  I find that 
respondents in areas with higher average earnings indeed have more financial worries after 
                                                 
25 The coefficients in the ordered Probit turn out to be similar in magnitude to those in the baseline regression partly 
because the root mean square error of the baseline regression is 1.06 and thus close to unity, to which the error term 
in the latent model of the ordered Probit is normalized.   22
controlling for own income and other own characteristics.  Because this question is less prone to 
a definition shift in response to neighbors’ earnings, this finding alleviates the concern about a 
shifting definition in the happiness question. 
  One might also expect that a couple surrounded by neighbors earning more, would have 
more disagreements about material issues as their aspirations might be shaped by spending 
patterns of those around them (Stutzer, 2004).  The regressions in specification 2 show that 
higher neighbors’ earnings are significantly associated with more frequent disagreements about 
money, marginally significantly associated with more frequent disagreements about household 
tasks, but not significantly with the frequency of fights about the children, sex, in-laws or 
spending time together.  It may be less clear why neighbors’ earnings would be associated with 
disagreements about household tasks, though one can make up plausible stories to explain this 
finding.
26  Because the questions about open disagreements seem less prone to a shift in 
definition in response to neighbors’ earnings, this finding also offers suggestive evidence that the 
estimated effect of neighbors’ earnings on self-reported happiness is not solely due to a shift in 
the definition of happiness. 
The third specification in Table 4 considers a measure of depression, which is the sum of 
the 12 items of the Radloff depression scale that are included in both waves of the survey.  Since 
many of the items have more of an absolute definition (e.g. “having a poor appetite,” “sleeping 
restlessly”) or at least a definition for which it might be hard to use neighbors’ behavior as a 
reference, the depression scale may be less prone to shifting definitions.  On the other hand, 
depression and well-being, though correlated, are two distinct concepts and it is very well 
possible that increases in neighbors’ earnings reduce true well-being without increasing 
                                                 
26 For example, financial stress could reduce the room for contracting out household tasks or buying appliances that 
ease household chores, leading to more disagreements about household tasks.   23
depression.  As the regression shows, neighbors’ earnings have no significant impact on the 
depression index.  Because the depression index is quite skewed, I also looked at the effect of 
neighbors’ earnings on the probability of being in each part of the distribution of depression 
index.  As specification four shows, higher neighbors’ earnings significantly increase the 
probability of being in the top four quintiles of the depression index but do not significantly 
affect the probability of being in the top three, top two or top quintile of the depression index.  
Thus, the effect of neighbors’ earnings seems to be limited to the bottom of the depression index 
distribution (i.e., only those furthest removed from being depressed come somewhat closer to 
being depressed).  Overall, the findings with depression as an outcome variable only slightly 
alleviate concerns about shifting definitions of happiness, though depression might be a 
sufficiently different concept from well-being to pick up relative position effects.
27  
  Since a large literature examines the effect of relative position on health outcomes, the 
fifth specification uses self-reported health status (relative to one’s age group) as an outcome 
measure.
28  I find no significant relation between average neighbors’ earnings and self-reported 
health.  This finding, of course, does not rule out that such a relationship might exist, but it does 
not show up using my baseline specification.
29   
 
Mechanisms behind the association between neighbors’ earnings and happiness 
                                                 
27 In their study of the randomized Moving to Opportunity experiment, Kling et al. (2004) find that individuals 
moving to lower poverty census tracts report lower levels of psychological distress.  Thus, for mental health 
measures such as depression or psychological distress the benefits associated with richer areas (such as lower crime) 
apparently outweigh any relative position effect. 
28 Self-reported health is measured by the question “Compared with other people your age, how would you describe 
your health?” with possible answers being very poor, poor, fair, good and excellent.  Since the question about health 
explicitly asks respondents to compare themselves to other people of their age, this outcome cannot be used to 
address any concerns about a shifting definition of happiness. 
29 Many papers on relative position and health use relative deprivation (the income gap with those earning more) 
rather than average neighbors’ income to measure status.  In addition, my sample might be too small or the measure 
of self-reported health too noisy to pick up an effect.   24
  One can think of overall self-reported happiness as being driven by one’s satisfaction 
with various domains of life, such as one’s family life, financial situation or friendships (Van 
Praag, Frijters and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2003).  Only in wave 2, the NSFH asks respondents to rate 
their satisfaction with 11 such domains on a 7-point scale.  Table 5 shows a regression of self-
reported happiness on these 11 measures of satisfaction (but no other controls) to give the reader 
a sense of the relative importance of these satisfaction components for self-reported happiness.  
According to this regression, the top three predictors of self-reported happiness are satisfaction 
with family life, financial situation and sex life (in that order).   
  Table 6 explores which mechanisms underlie the relationship between happiness and 
neighbors’ earnings by adding satisfaction measures as additional control variables.  If the 
addition of a control variable reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on neighbors’ earnings, 
some of the effect of neighbors’ earnings apparently runs through that control variable.  The first 
row of the table replicates the baseline regression for wave 2 because the satisfaction measures 
are only available in wave 2.  Specification 2 shows the effects of including satisfaction 
measures as additional controls.  None of the satisfaction measures alone can render the effect of 
neighbors’ earnings insignificant, but the effect of neighbors’ earnings is reduced most strongly 
if satisfaction with one’s home, financial situation or amount of leisure time is included as a 
control.  Simultaneously controlling for these three satisfaction measures makes the relationship 
between neighbors’ earnings and happiness statistically and economically insignificant.  Thus, 
apparently, higher neighbors’ earnings reduce happiness for a large part through their effect on 
satisfaction with one’s home, finances and leisure time.  If neighbors’ consumption patterns 
shape one’s aspirations, it is not surprising that higher neighbors’ earnings reduce one’s 
satisfaction with one’s financial situation or one’s home.  Perhaps less expected is that   25
satisfaction amount of leisure can account for part of the relationship between neighbors’ 
earnings and happiness, but higher neighbors’ earnings could reduce satisfaction with the amount 
of leisure time because one might cut back on the purchase of certain services (cleaning, yard, 
maintenance) in order to keep up with the neighbors in the consumption of more visible goods. 
  Even if status influences happiness, one would not expect it to affect happiness with 
aspects of life that are largely unaffected by comparisons with neighbors.  Indeed, the remaining 
eight questions on life satisfaction cannot account for much of the relationship between 
neighbors’ earnings and happiness, even though they include important general predictors of 
happiness such as satisfaction with family life and health (recall Table 5).
30  Even controlling for 
all eight simultaneously leaves the relationship between neighbors’ earnings and happiness 
significant at the 5% level.  Thus it seems that, by and large, neighbors’ earnings affect 
happiness primarily through those components of happiness for which one would expect relative 
earnings to matter most. 
 
Interaction effects 
  Table 7 investigates whether the relationship between neighbors’ earnings and happiness 
operates across a range of demographic subgroups.  Specification 1 shows that both females and 
males report being less happy if earnings in their area rise.  Specification 2 shows that the 
happiness of individuals in various age ranges is negatively related to neighbors’ earnings.  Even 
though the coefficients on neighbors’ earnings are not statistically significantly different from 
each other at the 10% level, the effect seems least strong for individuals aged 30 or younger, 
                                                 
30 One might have expected satisfaction with present job to be influenced by neighbors’ earnings.  Perhaps this 
question measures job aspects (such as corporate culture) that are less subject to comparison with neighbors.   26
which may not be surprising because this group is probably less settled and therefore less 
inclined to compare themselves to their current neighbors.   
  Specification 3 finds that both those with more and with less education report lower 
levels of happiness when surrounded by richer neighbors.  For each educational group, the point 
estimate is negative and the point estimates are not significantly different from each other at the 
10 percent level.  Specification 4 shows the relationship between local earnings and happiness 
across groups based on marital status.  Though the hypothesis that the coefficients on neighbors’ 
earnings are all equal to each other cannot be rejected at the 10% level, there seems to be little or 
no effect of neighbors’ earnings on happiness for never-married individuals or those 
experiencing marital status transitions.  This is not surprising because these individuals are likely 
to be less settled and thus less inclined to consider their neighbors as their reference group. 
  Might neighbors’ earnings not matter by themselves but only affect people’s happiness 
because they are correlated with the price of housing?  In this case, we would expect to see a 
differential effect between renters (who dislike increases in the price of housing) and 
homeowners (most of whom like seeing the value of their home rise).  Specification 5 shows that 
this is not the case.  Or might neighbors’ earnings somehow operate through the quality of 
schooling (e.g. richer neighbors leaving the public school system)?  In this case, we should see 
different effects for those with and without children, which, as specification 6 shows, is not the 
case.  Finally, specification 7 finds that the effect of neighbors’ earnings seems to be somewhat 
stronger for relatively new residents (less than 7 years) than for longer-term residents, but the 
difference is not statistically significant.
31   
  To investigate which parts of the happiness distribution are affected by neighbors’ 
earnings, I create four dummy variables corresponding respectively to reporting a level of 
                                                 
31 Looking at finer partitions of duration of residence did not reveal any interesting patterns.   27
happiness of at least 4, 5, 6 and 7.
32  Regressions (not-reported) of these dummy variables on 
neighbors’ earnings and the remaining controls of the baseline regression yield a significantly 
negative coefficient on neighbors’ earnings in all four cases, showing that the effect of 
neighbors’ earnings operates throughout the happiness distribution.  In additional unreported 
regressions, I also examine whether the relation between neighbors’ earnings and happiness 
displays non-linearities but I find no evidence of such effects.  The point estimates of neighbors’ 
earnings on self-reported happiness are similar and not significantly different for those above 
mean earnings in their PUMA compared to those below.  Other specifications show that the point 
estimates on a quadratic term in neighbors’ earnings or the interaction between own household 
income and neighbors’ earnings are both small and statistically insignificant. 
  If the neighbors’ earnings reduce self-reported happiness because people engage in social 
comparisons, we would expect a stronger effect for those with more contacts with their 
neighbors.  Table 8 investigates this hypothesis.  The NSFH asks all main respondents about the 
frequency of social interactions with neighbors, relatives, friends living outside the neighborhood 
and people they work with.  Each specification in Table 8 compares the effect of neighbors’ 
earnings for those who have infrequent social contacts (less than once a month) to those with 
frequent social contacts with the type of person indicated, controlling for the direct effect of 
social interactions.
33  The table shows that the effect of neighbors’ earnings is significantly 
stronger for those who socialize frequently with neighbors but not for those who socialize more 
frequently with relatives, friends outside the neighborhood or people they work with.  These 
                                                 
32 I don’t partition the happiness distribution at 3 and 2 because only 3.5% and 1.0% of the observations respectively 
report levels of happiness lower than these values. 
33 The direct effect is positive in all cases but only significant for socializing with neighbors or relatives.  Of course, 
the direct effect should not be interpreted causally.   28
findings are consistent with what one would expect if social comparisons with neighbors partly 
determine people’s happiness. 
  Table 9 explores whether individuals predominantly compare themselves with neighbors 
who have a similar level of education.  For each PUMA, I constructed predicted earnings for 
PUMA residents with a college degree and for those without.
34 Specification 1 shows the 
regression of self-reported happiness on the interaction of these two measures of local earnings 
with own educational attainment.  The regression also includes all the controls of the baseline 
regression.  Though standard errors are large, the point estimates indicate that the happiness of 
those without a college degree declines with the earnings of neighbors without a college degree 
but is insensitive to the earnings of neighbors with a college degree.  Similarly, the happiness of 
those with a college degree declines with the earnings of neighbors with a college degree but is 
relatively insensitive to the earnings of neighbors without one.  Moreover, for both those with 
and without a college degree, the point estimates on the earnings of one’s own education group 
are similar (the diagonal coefficients are -0.28 and -0.40) as are the point estimates on the 
earnings of the other group (the off-diagonal coefficients are 0.02 and -0.07).  In specification 2, 
I restrict the diagonal coefficients to be the same and the off-diagonal coefficients to be the same.  
Now there is a marginally significant relationship between happiness and earnings of neighbors 
with the same level of education but not between happiness and earnings of neighbors with a 
different level of education, though the test of equality of all coefficients is not rejected at the 
10% level.  Though the results in table 9 should be treated with caution because of low statistical 
power, they are suggestive of respondents comparing themselves mostly with neighbors who are 
similar in terms of educational attainment.  
                                                 
34 This measure is constructed the same way as the predicted Ln PUMA earnings measure used in the baseline 
regression, except that everything is done separately by level of education.   29
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper shows that individuals’ self-reported happiness is negatively affected by the 
earnings of others in their area.  By looking at alternative outcome measures, such as frequency 
of financial worries, I provide evidence that this finding is not simply an artifact of the way 
people report happiness.  I investigate the concern that the finding could be driven by omitted 
variables, but find no evidence of selection in a number of specification tests.  Though the 
mechanism by which increases in neighbors’ earnings reduce happiness is hard to identify 
precisely, I provide suggestive evidence that interpersonal preferences are likely to be 
responsible for them.  Increased neighbors’ earnings by and large reduce satisfaction with 
material (rather than immaterial) aspects of one’s life and have the strongest negative effect on 
happiness for those who socialize more in their neighborhood.  I therefore conclude that the 
negative effect of neighbors’ earnings on well-being is real and that it is most likely caused by a 
psychological externality, i.e. people having utility functions that depend on relative 
consumption in addition to absolute consumption. 
  The size of the effect is economically meaningful.  An increase in neighbors’ earnings 
and a similarly sized decrease in own income each have roughly about the same negative effect 
on well-being.  This suggests that an increase in own income leads to a negative externality on 
neighbors’ well-being that is of the same order of magnitude as the positive effects on own well-
being.  Unless one chooses to disallow these negative externalities on the ground that they appear 
to stem from an interpersonal preference component that is morally questionable, externalities of 
this size can in principle substantially affect the optimal policies dealing with income taxation, 
consumption taxation and residential sorting.   30
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Appendices: 
 
Appendix A: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
The baseline sample consists of individuals who are married or cohabitating in both waves of the 
NSFH and have non-missing information on own household income.  Unless otherwise noted, 
the variables in the baseline sample consist of the average of the non-missing values of that 
variable for the main respondent and his or her spouse.  All dollar amounts are converted to 
1982-84 real dollars using the CPI-U from Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
Table A1: Variable Definitions 
Variable name  Description 
Self-reported happiness  The answer to the question: “Next are some questions about how you see yourself 
and your life. Taking things all together, how would you say things are these days?” 
where 1 denotes “very unhappy” and 7 denotes “very happy”.  Values in between 
did not have explicit labels. 
Ln PUMA earnings (predicted)  Log average predicted pre-tax earnings of all non-institutionalized working age 
persons (16 ≤ age < 65) with non-missing industry and occupation codes living in 
the PUMA of the NSFH respondent. See Appendix B for details. 
Ln PUMA earnings (actual)  Log average actual pre-tax earnings of all non-institutionalized working age persons 
(16 ≤ age < 65) with non-missing industry and occupation codes living in the 
PUMA of the NSFH respondent. 
Ln PUMA income (actual)  Log average actual pre-tax per-capita income of all non-institutionalized persons 
living in the PUMA of the NSFH respondent. 
Ln PUMA earnings (pred.)|no 
college, Ln PUMA earnings 
(pred.)| college 
Same as Ln PUMA earnings (predicted) described above, except that the prediction 
is done separately for people in the PUMA with and without a college degree. See 
Appendix B for details 
Ln Household income   Log household total pre-tax income constructed by the NSFH using information 
from both the main respondent and his or her spouse. NSFH variable names: 
“IHTOT2” in wave 1 and “MUHHTOT” in wave 2. 
Ln Predicted earnings of R and 
spouse 
Log pre-tax earnings of the main respondent and his/her spouse based on the 
industry×occupation codes of the respondent and the spouse and the earnings by 
industry×occupation×time-period from the CPS MORG.  See Appendix B for 
details. 
Ln Actual earnings of R and 
spouse 
Log pre-tax earnings of the main respondent and his/her spouse. 
Ln Value of home  Log current value of the respondent’s home if the respondent is a homeowner. 
Answer to the question “How much do you think your home would sell for now?”. 
Renter  Dummy for renting one’s home. 
Ln Usual working hours  Log total usual working hours in one’s main and secondary job.  Non-working 
individuals are assigned the mean log working hours to make the dummies for 
unemployment and not-in-the-labor force more easily interpretable. 
Unemployed  Dummy for being unemployed defined as not currently employed and having 
looked for work during the past 4 weeks. 
Not in the labor force  Dummy for those neither currently employed nor unemployed. 
Non-Hispanic white; Black; 
Hispanic; Asian; Other race or 
race n/a 
Answer to the question “Which of the groups on this card best describes you? 01-
Black; 02-White-not of Hispanic origin; 03-Mexican American; Chicano, 
Mexicano; 04-Puerto Rican; 05-Cuban; 06-Other Hispanic; 07-American Indian; 
08-Asian; 09-Other”.  Categories 3,4,5 and 6 are combined into “Hispanic” and 
categories 7,9 and no answer are combined into “Other race or race n/a”. 
Married or cohabiting; 
Separated; Divorced; 
Cohabiting individuals (even if separated, divorced or widowed) are coded into the 
Married or cohabitating category.   35
Widowed; Never married; 
Missing marital status  
Educational attainment (years)  Years of completed education at the time of the wave 1 interview as defined by the 
NSFH constructed variable “EDUCAT”. 
Religious affiliation dummies 
(13) 
Answer to the question: “What is your religious preference? (IF PROTESTANT, 
ASK):  What specific denomination is that?”.  I grouped the 65 possible responses 
to this question into 13 major categories. 
Wave  The wave of the NSFH data. Wave 1 was fielded between March 1988 and May 
1989 with most of the interviews conducted in the summer of 1988.  Wave 2 was 
fielded between July 1992 and July 1994 with most of the interviews conducted in 
1993. 
Spousal record exists  Dummy if a spouse was interviewed. 
Frequency of financial worries  The answer to the question: “How often do you worry that your total family income 
will not be enough to meet your family's expenses and bills.  Would you say: 1-
Almost all the time; 2-Often; 3-Once in a while; 4-Hardly ever; 5-Never.”  This 
question was only asked in wave 2. 
Frequency of open marital 
disagreements about 
[household tasks; money; 
spending time together; sex; in-
laws; the children]: 
The answer to the question: “The following is a list of subjects on which couples 
often have disagreements. How often, if at all, in the last year have you had open 
disagreements about each of the following [household tasks; money; spending time 
together; sex; in-laws; the children]: 01-Never;  02-Less than once a month; 03-
Several times a month; 04-About once a week; 05-Several times a week; 06-Almost 
everyday.”                
Depression Index (based on 
Radloff) 
Twelve items from the Radloff depression index were asked in both waves: “Next is 
a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved during the past week. On how 
many days during the past week did you: [Feel bothered by things that usually don't 
bother you?; Not feel like eating; your appetite was poor?; Feel that you could not 
shake off the blues, even with help from your family or friends?; Have trouble 
keeping your mind on what you were doing?; Feel depressed?; Feel that everything 
you did was an effort?; Feel fearful?; Sleep restlessly?; Talk less than usual?; Feel 
lonely?; Feel sad?; Feel you could not get going?] (number of days).”  The answer 
to each question is the number of days (0-7) on which the condition applied. The 
depression index is the sum of the answers to these 12 questions. This variable is 
only based on the responses by the main respondent because the depression items 
were not asked of the spouse in the first wave. 
Self-reported health status  The answer to the question: “Compared with other people your age, how would you 
describe your health? 1-Very poor; 2-Poor; 3-Fair; 4-Good; 5-Excellent” 
Satisfaction with [home; 
neighborhood; city or town; 
financial situation; amount of 
leisure; health; physical 
appearance; friendships; sex 
life; family life; present job] 
The answer to the question: “Overall, how satisfied are you with... [Your home?; 
Your neighborhood?; Your city or town?; Your financial situation?; The amount of 
leisure time that you have?; Your health?; Your physical appearance?; Your 
friendships?; Your sex life?; Your family life?; Your present job?] where 1 denotes 
“very dissatisfied” and 7 denotes “very satisfied”.  Values in between did not have 
explicit labels. These questions were only asked in wave 2. 
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Baseline Sample Only 
N=8944 
Variable:  Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev.  N 
Self-reported happiness  5.346 1.38 19795 5.553 1.08 8944 
Ln PUMA earnings (predicted)  9.824 0.27 22979 9.843 0.26 8944 
Ln PUMA earnings (actual)  9.820 0.24 22979 9.835 0.24 8944 
Ln PUMA income (actual)  9.471 0.30 22979 9.492 0.29 8944 
Ln PUMA earnings (pred.)|no college  9.451 0.15 22979 9.471 0.14 8944 
Ln PUMA earnings (pred.)| college  10.904 0.16 22979 10.917 0.15 8944 
Ln Household income  9.886 1.10 19037 10.346 0.75  8944 
Ln Predicted earnings of R and spouse  9.825 1.12 16984 10.197 0.92 8125 
Ln Actual earnings of R and spouse  9.804 0.74 19676 10.131 0.62 8091 
Ln Value of home  10.871 0.88 12408 10.979 0.82 6788 
Renter  0.409 0.49 23010 0.217 0.41 8944 
Ln Usual working hours  3.692 0.44 13416 3.694 0.39 7255 
Unemployed  0.029 0.17 23010 0.019 0.10 8944 
Not in the labor force  0.342 0.47 23010 0.317 0.36 8944 
Female  0.605 0.49 23010 n/a n/a n/a 
Age  44.669 16.91 23010 43.282 14.03 8944 
Non-Hispanic white  0.734 0.44 23010 0.828 0.36 8944 
Black  0.179 0.38 23010 0.091 0.28 8944 
Hispanic  0.073 0.26 23010 0.059 0.22 8944 
Asian  0.009 0.10 23010 0.010 0.09 8944 
Other race or race n/a  0.005 0.07 23010 0.012 0.08 8944 
Married or cohabiting  0.601 0.49 23010 1.000 0.00 8944 
Separated  0.041 0.20 23010 0.000 0.00 8944 
Divorced  0.121 0.33 23010 0.000 0.00 8944 
Widowed  0.104 0.31 23010 0.000 0.00 8944 
Never married  0.133 0.34 23010 0.000 0.00 8944 
Missing marital status  0.0002 0.01 23010 0.000 0.00 8944 
Educational attainment (years)  12.518 3.11 22924 12.997 2.62 8940 
Dummy for college or more  0.178 0.38 23010 0.232 0.37 8944 
Ln Household size  0.914 0.56 23010 1.139 0.39 8944 
No religion  0.084 0.28 23010 0.084 0.23 8944 
Catholic  0.240 0.43 23010 0.242 0.40 8944 
Jewish  0.020 0.14 23010 0.023 0.14 8944 
Baptist  0.235 0.42 23010 0.201 0.37 8944 
Episcopalian  0.020 0.14 23010 0.021 0.13 8944 
Lutheran  0.054 0.23 23010 0.063 0.22 8944 
Methodist  0.097 0.30 23010 0.106 0.28 8944 
Mormon  0.022 0.15 23010 0.028 0.16 8944 
Presbyterian  0.033 0.18 23010 0.041 0.18 8944 
Congregational  0.017 0.13 23010 0.021 0.12 8944 
Protestant, no denomination  0.043 0.20 23010 0.030 0.13 8944 
Other Christian  0.114 0.32 23010 0.118 0.29 8944 
Other religions / missing  0.022 0.15 23010 0.023 0.12 8944   37
Wave  1.435 0.50 23010 1.538 0.50 8944 
Spousal record exists  0.503 0.50 23010 0.893 0.31 8944 
          
Additional variables for table 4          
Frequency of financial worries  
(wave 2 only)  3.093 1.21 9713 2.997 1.02 5001 
Frequency of open marital 
disagreements about:      
 money  2.069 1.15 13019 2.079 0.99 9125 
 the  children  2.097 1.27 10277 2.366 1.67 8664 
 household  tasks  1.992 1.07 13026 2.022 0.93 9122 
 sex  1.748 1.11 12700 1.782 0.95 9044 
  spending time together  1.997 1.29 12974 1.998 1.07 9120 
 in-laws  1.494 0.88 12765 1.568 1.50 9156 
Depression Index (based on Radloff)  14.913 16.68 21511 12.215 14.49 8782 
Self-reported health status  3.949 0.86 21992 4.021 0.65 9173 
    
Additional variables for tables 5 & 6 
(wave 2 only) 
Observations 
in wave 2: 10004 
Baseline observations 
in wave 2: 5067 
Satisfaction with family life  5.749 1.42 9682 5.881 1.06 4806 
Satisfaction with financial situation  4.525 1.71 9658 4.780 1.40 4800 
Satisfaction with sex life  5.011 1.87 9232 5.276 1.39 4766 
Satisfaction with home  5.491 1.52 9742 5.622 1.18 4806 
Satisfaction with health  5.384 1.54 9694 5.436 1.16 4805 
Satisfaction with present job  5.161 1.68 7036 5.301 1.36 4150 
Satisfaction with amount of leisure  4.558 1.80 9685 4.514 1.47 4805 
Satisfaction with friendships  5.697 1.35 9688 5.676 1.03 4803 
Satisfaction with city or town  5.317 1.54 9643 5.383 1.23 4803 
Satisfaction with physical appearance  5.144 1.47 9692 5.118 1.12 4805 
Satisfaction with neighborhood  5.420 1.60 9719 5.532 1.28 4805 
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Appendix B: Construction of Predictor for PUMA- and Industry×Occupation Earnings 
 
This appendix provides a detailed description of the construction of both the PUMA-level 
earnings predictor and the predictor of average earnings at the industry×occupation level.  The 
construction of these predictors is described in seven steps.   
 
Step 1: Creation of a common set of industry×occupation codes 
The industry and occupation codes in the first wave of the NSFH as well as in the 1987 
and 1988 CPS MORG files are 3-digit 1980 Census codes, while 3-digit 1990 Census codes were 
used in the second NSFH wave, the 1992-1994 CPS MORG files and (obviously) the 1990 
Census PUMS.  I create a crosswalk to make these two sets of codes compatible.  In general, the 
1980 and 1990 Census industry and occupation classification is very similar.  In a few cases, I 
need to merge several 3-digit occupations or industries together in order to make the codes 
comparable.  I exclude the active-duty military.  The crosswalk transforms 231 industry codes 
from the 1980 Census and 236 industry codes from the 1990 Census into a set of 225 unique and 
comparable industry codes.  Similarly, it transforms 503 occupation codes from the 1980 Census 
and 501 occupation codes from the 1990 Census into a set of 496 unique and comparable 
occupation codes. 
 
Step 2:  Calculation of average industry×occupation×time-period earnings from CPS MORG: 
I use the NBER CPS labor abstracts to obtain usual weekly earnings (“earnwke”) by 
industry×occupation for the years 1987-88 and 1992-94 for all employees (self-employed 
individuals are excluded because their earnings data is often unreliable).  To ensure compatibility 
over time, all earnings are deflated by the 1982-84 CPI-U, all topcoded earnings are replaced by 
twice the value of the topcode
35, and the sum of weights is made identical across years.  Step 2 
yields two variables: LnEarn1, average log annual earnings by industry×occupation cell in 1987-
1988, and LnEarn2, average log annual earnings by industry×occupation cell in 1992-1994.  
These variables differ by state because data from the own state is excluded in calculating the 
average. 
 
Step 3: Prediction of average earnings by industry×occupation×time-period  cell 
Because many industry×occupation cells have very few observations or are empty in the 
CPS data but are non-empty in the NSFH or Census PUMS, I use a linear regression to predict 
earnings in each industry×occupation cell in each time period.  I regress LnEarn1 on a full set of 
3-digit industry dummies and a full set of 3-digit occupation dummies where each 
industry×occupation cell is weighted by the weighted number of observation in that cell in the 
MORG.  I run this regression separately for each state (because of the exclusion of the own state 
information).  On average, these regressions have about 20,000 observations. The regressions 
yield the earnings predictor LnEarnPred1.  Similar regressions for wave 2 yield the earnings 
predictor LnEarnPred2.   
 
Step 4: Taking a weighted average between actual and predicted earnings 
The benefit of the predictor described in step 3 is that it yields predicted earnings for 
industry×occupation×time-period cells that are empty in the CPS MORG and that it increases the 
                                                 
35  This is the expectation of a topcoded earnings variable if the tail of the earnings distribution follows a Pareto 
distribution with a parameter of 2, which seems to be the case empirically (Saez, 2001).   39
precision of the earnings estimate for industry×occupation×time-period cells with very few 
observations (in wave 1 (2), 75% of the industry×occupation cells have 8 (9) or fewer 
observations in them).  However, by not allowing industry×occupation interactions, the 
regression may not be the best predictor of earnings for cells with a large number of 
observations.  To balance these two concerns, I take a weighted average, LnEarnHatt, between 
predicted earnings and actual earnings, where the weight depends on n, the number of 
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and similarly for wave 2.  The parameter, 
eff
t n  or the relative weight on predicted earnings is 
estimated by a non-linear least squares regression of log average earnings from the PUMS on the 
left hand side of the equation above, where industry×occupation cells are weighted by the 
weighted number of observations in them in the PUMS.  This yields n
eff of 22.9 and 25.1 for 
wave 1 and wave 2 respectively.  The R
2 of these regressions are 0.74 and 73 respectively.  The 
variable LnEarnHatt is merged to the NSFH data (based on the wave of the survey and the 
respondent’s industry, occupation and state) and is the instrument for own household income 
used in specification 3 of table 1. 
 
Step 6: Prediction of PUMA-level earnings 
Using data from the 1990 Census 5% PUMS, I assign to each non-institutionalized 
person aged 16-65 the level of the predicted earnings, exp(LnEarnHat), based on that person’s 
industry, occupation and state.  I do this both for predicted earnings in 1987-88 and in 1992-94.  
Next, I calculate the average predicted level of earnings for each PUMA for each time period.  
The log of the average predicted level of earnings for each time period and PUMA is the variable 
LnPumaPred. 
 
Step 7: Rescaling of LnPumaPredt 
  To test the predictive power of LnPumaPredt, I regress both LnPumaPred1 and 
LnPumaPred2 on log actual PUMA-level earnings in 1989 (from the 1990 Census) for the 
sample of 1315 PUMAs that occur in the NSFH data.
36  Though both regressions have a high R
2 
(0.846 and 0.861 respectively), the coefficient on log actual 1989 PUMA level earnings is only 
around a half.  Thus, while the predictor apparently does a good job ranking PUMAs by 
earnings, it underestimates earnings differences.  To correct for this underprediction, I multiply 
each predictor by 2.19.  After this rescaling, a regression of the average of LnPumaPred1 and 
LnPumaPred2 on log actual PUMA-level earnings in 1989 yields a coefficient of exactly one.  
This rescaling reduces the coefficient on PUMA-level earnings as an independent variable by a 
factor of about two but it of course does not affect the statistical significance of any of the results 
in the paper.  In the rest of the paper, I refer to the rescaled predictor of PUMA-level earnings as 
Ln Puma Earnings (predicted) or, when there is no risk of confusion, Ln Puma Earnings for 
short. 
 
                                                 
36 Some of these PUMAs do not contain NFSH main respondents but only secondary NSFH respondents (such as 
ex-spouses).  Hence, there are more PUMAs in this sample than in the baseline sample described in the data section.   40
Validation using NSFH data 
As a check on both the PUMA-level and industry×occupation-level predictors of 
earnings, I regress log earnings of NSFH respondents (with earnings of at least $100/year) on 
these predictors.  The first row shows that the predictor of PUMA level earnings is highly 
significant, has a coefficient of about 0.75 and explains about 3.5% of the individual-level 
earnings variation.  The second row shows that results are similar if we use the log of average 
actual earnings in the PUMA of the respondent in 1989.  This shows that the use of predicted 
rather than actual earnings does not entail a huge loss of predictive power.  The third, fourth and 
fifth row show that the results are similar for each wave and hold up if state fixed effects are 
included.  
Rows (6) through (10), repeat these checks for the measure of industry × occupation 
earnings constructed in step 5 above.  This measure is highly significant and has a coefficient 
reasonably close to one in all cases.  Row (7) shows that results remain similar if we instead use 
log average earnings in 1989 by industry×occupation cell from the 1990 Census.  This confirms 




Table A2: Validation of Earnings Predictor by PUMA and by Industry × Occupation 
Dependent variable: Ln Respondent’s Real Earnings        
     
 Independent  variable  Comment  Coefficient S.E. Adj.  R
2 N
(1)  Ln PUMA earnings (predicted)  baseline 0.751 0.04 0.0341 14845
(2)  Ln PUMA earnings (actual, 1989)  actual 1989, not predicted  0.931 0.05 0.0418 14845
(3)  Ln PUMA earnings (predicted)  only wave 1  0.702 0.05 0.0320 7899
(4)  Ln PUMA earnings (predicted)  only wave 2  0.852 0.05 0.0400 6946
(5)  Ln PUMA earnings (predicted)  including state fixed effects  0.676 0.04 0.0434 14845
    
(6)  Ln Industry×occupation earnings  baseline 0.859 0.02 0.2732 13980
(7)  Ln Census Industry×occupation 
earnings in 1989 
Average 1989 earnings by 
ind.×occ. from 1990 Census 
0.721 0.02 0.2513 12541
(8)  Ln Industry×occupation earnings  only wave 1  0.852 0.02 0.2754 7644
(9)  Ln Industry×occupation earnings  only wave 2  0.854 0.03 0.2622 6336
(10)  Ln Industry×occupation earnings  including state fixed effects  0.849 0.02 0.2836 13980
            
Note: In specifications (1)-(5), standard errors are corrected for clustering at the PUMA level while in specifications 
(6)-(10) they are adjusted for clustering at the industry × occupation level.   
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Table 1: Baseline Regression 
Dependent  variable:    (1)  (2)  (3) 
Self-reported happiness 




for own income 
   Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.    Coeff. S.E.
Ln PUMA earnings (predicted)   -0.208
** 0.052 -0.249
** 0.069   -0.279
** 0.067
     
Ln Household Income     0.121
** 0.020  0.110
** 0.024   0.365
** 0.100
Ln Value of home     0.052
** 0.021  0.051
** 0.024  
Renter   -0.182
** 0.032 -0.222
** 0.038  
     
Ln Usual working hours    -0.068
** 0.044 -0.111
** 0.036   -0.137
** 0.052
Unemployed   -0.428
** 0.124 -0.255
** 0.114   -0.352
** 0.148
Not in the labor force   0.149
** 0.043 0.066
** 0.043   0.252
** 0.065
     
Female   -0.046
** 0.034  
Age spline (effect p.y. on segment 19-35)   -0.018
** 0.004 -0.019
** 0.005   -0.020
** 0.005
Age spline (effect p.y. on segment 35-60)   0.002
** 0.002 0.002
** 0.003   0.001
** 0.002
Age spline (effect p.y. on segment 60 plus)  0.013
** 0.004 0.009
** 0.005   0.018
** 0.005
White(omitted)      
Black   -0.060
** 0.050 -0.012
** 0.060   -0.054
** 0.052
Hispanic   0.278
** 0.063 0.189
** 0.074   0.286
** 0.067
Asian   -0.067
** 0.117 -0.150
** 0.129   -0.045
** 0.117
Other race / ethnicity   -0.136
** 0.216 0.085
** 0.405   -0.093
** 0.210
Years of education   0.011
** 0.007 0.010
** 0.007   -0.007
** 0.012
Ln Household size   -0.166
** 0.038 -0.176
** 0.044   -0.180
** 0.040
     
Catholic (omitted)      
No religion     0.170
** 0.058 -0.155
** 0.061   -0.162
** 0.058
Jewish   -0.310
** 0.098 -0.288
** 0.112   -0.314
** 0.098
Baptist   0.130
** 0.041 0.058
** 0.045   0.147
** 0.041
Episcopalian   -0.063
** 0.091 -0.008
** 0.097   -0.066
** 0.092
Lutheran     0.003
** 0.055 -0.089
** 0.064   0.003
** 0.056
Methodist     0.048
** 0.045 0.063
** 0.051   0.049
** 0.045
Mormon     0.041
** 0.079 -0.037
** 0.088   0.048
** 0.085
Presbyterian   -0.013
** 0.073  -0.103
** 0.077   -0.008
** 0.072
Congregational     0.040
** 0.095 -0.055
** 0.103   0.072
** 0.098
Protestant, no denomination     0.042
** 0.103 0.035
** 0.078   0.065
** 0.104
Other Christian      0.105
** 0.047 0.025
** 0.054   0.122
** 0.049
Other religions / missing   0.041
** 0.104 0.070
** 0.121   -0.070
** 0.108
                
Adjusted R
2     0.0371  0.0238   … 
Number of observations    8944  8023  8944 
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on PUMAs (1000 clusters in specifications 1 and 3; 974 clusters in specification 2).  Ln 
usual hours and Ln home value are demeaned. All regressions also include dummy variables for independent variables with missing values.  Self-
reported happiness is measured on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing “very happy.”  The sample consists of respondents of NSFH waves 1 and 
2 that are married or cohabiting in both waves. In specifications (1) and (3) the variables are the average of the respondent’s value and that of his 
or her spouse.  In specification (3), ln household income is instrumented by predicted ln household earnings where predicted earnings are based 
on the industry × occupation of the respondent and his or her spouse.   42
Table 2: Testing for Selection 
Dependent variable: 
Self-reported happiness 
       
Ln PUMA earnings Ln HH income   






        
(1) Baseline  -0.208
** 0.052 0.121
** 0.020 0.0371  8944 
       
(2) Individual  Fixed  Effect  -0.232
** 0.135 0.053
** 0.052 0.3102  8944 
       
(3) Including  State×Wave fixed effects, a 
dummy for metropolitan areas and log 
metropolitan area population  -0.189
** 0.065 0.119
** 0.020 0.0391  8944 
        
(4)  Observations remaining in same PUMA  -0.204
** 0.063 0.129
** 0.024 0.0381  6894 
       
(5)  Observations remaining in same PUMA  
and individual fixed effects  0.212
** 1.421 0.047
** 0.066 0.3170  6894 
        
(6)  Using predicted household income instead 
of household income and home value  -0.123
** 0.050 …
** …
** 0.0320  8944 
    
Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the PUMA level.  All regressions include the same controls as the baseline regression 
reported in table 1, column 1.  Whenever individual fixed effects are included, spousal variables are only used if the identity of the spouse 
remains the same in both waves. 
   43
Table 3: Robustness Checks 
Dependent variable: 
Self-reported happiness 
    
Ln PUMA earnings Ln HH income   






        
(1) Baseline  -0.208
** 0.052 0.121
** 0.020 0.0371  8944 
       
(2) 1989 actual Ln PUMA earnings as control 
(instead of predicted Ln PUMA earnings) -0.266
** 0.057 0.124
** 0.020 0.0377  8944 
       
(3) 1989 Ln PUMA p.c. income as control 
(instead of predicted Ln PUMA earnings)  -0.204
** 0.052 0.123
** 0.020 0.0372  8944 
       
(4) Full balanced panel sample  
(including non-married individuals)  -0.155
** 0.042 0.121
** 0.017 0.0651  15568 
        
(5) Controlling for 5
th order polynomial in Ln 
household income  -0.212
** 0.052 0.160
** 0.030 0.0375  8944 
        
(6) Ordered probit  -0.209
** 0.051 0.110
** 0.020 0.0107  8944 
        
(7) Ln earnings of R and spouse as control 
(instead of Ln HH income) -0.195
** 0.052 0.082
** 0.017 0.0370  8944 
       
Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the PUMA level.  All regressions include the same controls as the baseline regression 
reported in table 1, column 1.  The terms in the polynomial in specification 5 are demeaned.  Hence, the coefficient on the first term (reported in 
the table) is the slope of Ln household income for someone with mean Ln household income.  The regression in specification (4) also included 4 
marital status dummies as controls.   44
Table 4: Other Outcome Measures 
      
Ln PUMA earnings Ln HH income   






        
(1)  Financial worries 0.221
** 0.063 -0.388
** 0.034 0.2199  5001 
       
(2)  Frequency of open disagreements about:      
  a. money  0.129
** 0.044 -0.104
** 0.018 0.2261  9125 
  b. the children  0.096
** 0.062 -0.034
** 0.029 0.0781  8522 
  c. household tasks  0.080
** 0.044 -0.049
** 0.015 0.1865  9122 
  d. spending time together  0.059
** 0.055 -0.049
** 0.020 0.1484  9120 
  e. sex  0.053
** 0.044 -0.046
** 0.016 0.1481  9044 
  f. in-laws  0.020
** 0.051 -0.046
** 0.025 0.0743  9096 
       
(3) Depression  Index       
  Index (sum of 12 Radloff items)  -0.065
** 0.764 -1.334
** 0.251 0.0654  8782 
        
(4)  Distribution of the Depression Index       
  a. Dummy for being in the top 
    quintile of the depression index  -0.015
** 0.023 -0.037
** 0.007 0.0495  8782 
  b. Dummy for being in the top two 
    quintiles of the depression index  0.011
** 0.025 -0.030
** 0.008 0.0517  8782 
  c. Dummy for being in the top three 
    quintiles of the depression index  0.012
** 0.023 -0.017
** 0.009 0.0470  8782 
  d. Dummy for being in the top four  
    quintiles of the depression index  0.067
** 0.018 -0.003
** 0.007 0.0367  8782 
        
(5)  Health status relative to age group  -0.008
** 0.034 0.095
** 0.013 0.1489  9173 
       
Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the PUMA level.  All regressions include the same controls as the baseline regression 
reported in table 1, column 1 except for the regressions in specification 2, which also control for self-reported quality of relationship with spouse. 
The variable Financial worries exists only in wave 2 and is the answer to the question “How often do you worry that your total family income 
will not be enough to meet your family's expenses and bills?” where 1 corresponds to “never” and 5 to “almost all the time.”  The frequency of 
open disagreements is measured on a scale of 1 (“never”) to 6 (“almost every day”).  The depression index is the sum of the 12 Radloff items that 
appear in both waves of the NSFH.  Each item is the number of days in the past week that the respondent felt or experienced a symptom related to 
depression.  Examples of such symptoms are “sleeping restlessly,” “talking less than usual,” and “feeling sad.”  Self-reported health status is the 
answer to the question “Compared with other people your age, how would you describe your health?”, where 1 corresponds to “very poor” and 5 
to “excellent.” Specifications 3 and 4 only use data from the main respondent because the depression questions were only asked of the main 
respondent in all waves. 
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Table 5: Components of Happiness 
Dependent variable: 
Self-reported happiness 
    
   Coeff.  S.E. 
      
satisfaction with family life   0.278
** 0.019 
satisfaction with financial situation   0.144
** 0.013 
satisfaction with sex life   0.098
** 0.011 
satisfaction with home   0.092
** 0.016 
satisfaction with health   0.088
** 0.019 
satisfaction with present job   0.053
** 0.014 
satisfaction with amount of leisure time   0.039
** 0.013 
satisfaction with friendships   0.042
** 0.018 
satisfaction with city or town   0.022
** 0.015 
satisfaction with physical appearance   -0.015
** 0.018 
satisfaction with neighborhood   -0.024
** 0.015 
      
R
2   0.3989 
Number of observations    4808 
Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the PUMA level.  Not reported but included in the regression are dummies variables for 
missing values of the satisfaction questions.  The satisfaction variables are answers to the question; “Overall, how satisfied are you with... X,” 
where X is “your family life,”  “your financial situation,” etc.  The answers are recorded on a 7-point scale with 1 corresponding to “very 
dissatisfied” and 7 corresponding to “very satisfied”.   46
Table 6: Mechanisms 
Dependent variable: 
Self-reported happiness 
    
Ln PUMA earnings Ln HH income   






     
(1)  Baseline (wave 2 only)  -0.280
** 0.072 0.160
** 0.031 0.0298  4808 
       
(2)  Additional controls for Satisfaction with 
(wave 2 only):      
  a. home   -0.139
** 0.064 0.138
** 0.030 0.1768  4808 
  b. financial situation  -0.146
** 0.063 -0.038
** 0.029 0.1918  4808 
  c. amount of leisure time  -0.165
** 0.066 0.130
** 0.030 0.1340  4808 
  d. sex life  -0.180
** 0.062 0.120
** 0.029 0.2171  4808 
  e. present job  -0.190
** 0.068 0.111
** 0.030 0.1165  4808 
  f. friendships  -0.198
** 0.064 0.142
** 0.029 0.1635  4808 
  g. health  -0.203
** 0.063 0.104
** 0.029 0.1556  4808 
  h. family life   -0.205
** 0.059 0.140
** 0.027 0.2974  4808 
  i. physical appearance  -0.237
** 0.065 0.141
** 0.030 0.1305  4808 
  j. neighborhood  -0.241
** 0.068 0.152
** 0.030 0.0916  4808 
  k. city or town  -0.307
** 0.065 0.149
** 0.031 0.0946  4808 
        
  l. Top 3 (home, finance, leisure)  -0.058
** 0.058 0.011
** 0.028 0.2663  4808 
  m. Bottom 8 (sex – city or town)    -0.139
** 0.055 0.094
** 0.026 0.3630  4808 
       
Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the PUMA level.  All regressions include the same controls as the baseline regression 
reported in table 1, column 1.   
   47
Table 7: Interactions With Respondent Characteristics 
Dependent variable: 
Self-reported happiness 
    
Ln PUMA earnings Ln HH income  






(1) Gender    0.0236  8023 
   Male  -0.210
** 0.093 0.114
** 0.033   [3636] 
   Female  -0.283
** 0.092 0.107
** 0.033   [4387] 
       
(2) Age   0.0376  8944 
             age ≤ 30  -0.089
** 0.114 0.086
** 0.042   [1660] 
    30 < age ≤ 40     -0.229
** 0.089 0.105
** 0.039   [2943] 
    40 < age ≤ 60     -0.250
** 0.090 0.172
** 0.034   [3000] 
    60 < age   -0.225
** 0.151 0.099
** 0.045   [1342] 
       
(3) Education    0.0377  8944 
   Missing  -0.540
** 0.340 0.018
** 0.130   [291] 
   High  school  dropout  -0.203
** 0.189    0.130
** 0.049   [1401] 
   High  school  degree    -0.254
** 0.120    0.178
** 0.037   [3263] 
   Some  college  -0.101
** 0.130   0.088
** 0.049   [1915] 
    College degree or more  -0.195
** 0.096 0.052
** 0.040   [2075] 
       
(4)  Marital status transitions    0.0536  14500 
    Remains married or cohabiting     -0.200
** 0.067   0.120
** 0.023   [8023] 
    Remains divorced or separated     -0.392
** 0.154   0.13
** 0.048   [1524] 
   Remains  widowed  -0.159
** 0.180 0.074
** 0.058   [1032] 
   Remains  never  married  -0.116
** 0.179   0.116
** 0.051   [995] 
   Marital  status  change  -0.019
** 0.093   0.125
** 0.034   [2926] 
       
(5) Home  ownership    0.0376  8944 
   Rents  -0.191
** 0.102 0.185
** 0.036   [1939] 
   Owns   -0.235
** 0.060 0.092
** 0.024   [7005] 
       
(6)  Presence of child(ren) aged ≤ 18    0.0372  8944 
    No child(ren) present in HH  -0.212
** 0.077 0.127
** 0.025   [3853] 
    Child(ren) present in HH  -0.206
** 0.067 0.111
** 0.028   [5091] 
       
(7)  Lives in current home…    0.0375  8944 
    less than 7 years  -0.207
** 0.070 0.096
** 0.026   [4193] 
    7 years or more  -0.156
** 0.076 0.144
** 0.029   [3870] 
   duration  is  missing  -0.431
** 0.141 0.141
** 0.063   [881] 
Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the PUMA level.  Each specification is a single OLS regression in which Ln PUMA earnings 
and Ln household income are interacted with an exhaustive set of dummies.  All regressions also include as controls the uninteracted set of 
dummy variables as well as the same controls as the baseline regression reported in table 1, column 1.  Except for specification (4), the baseline 
sample consisting of individuals married or cohabiting in both waves is used.  In specification (1) only information from the main respondent is 
used (because there is virtually no variation in the average gender of couples). In specification (4), no interactions with PUMA earnings or own 
household income are included for 2 observations with missing marital status transitions.  The hypothesis that the coefficients on Ln PUMA 
earnings are all equal to each other cannot be rejected at a significance level of 0.10 or lower for any of the specifications. The number of 
observations in each category is denoted between square brackets.   
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(1)  Socialize with a neighbor  0.0400  8944 
    Less than once a month or missing  -0.121
** 0.071 0.129
** 0.026  [5076] 
    Once a month or more frequently    -0.314
** 0.064 0.110
** 0.027  [3868] 
  P-value on test of equal coefficients  [0.029] [0.575]    
     
(2) Socialize  with  relatives  0.0383  8944 
    Less than once a month or missing  -0.140
** 0.077 0.139
** 0.033  [2927] 
    Once a month or more frequently   -0.243
** 0.061 0.110
** 0.023  [6017] 
  P-value on test of equal coefficients  [0.257] [0.452]    
     






    Less than once a month or missing  -0.233
** 0.083 0.154
** 0.031  [4119] 
    Once a month or more frequently  -0.185
** 0.064 0.088
** 0.026  [4825] 
  P-value on test of equal coefficients  [0.640] [0.106]    
     
(4)  Socialize with people one works with  0.0374  8944 
    Less than once a month or missing  -0.187
** 0.064 0.137
** 0.023  [6325] 
    Once a month or more frequently  -0.249
** 0.081 0.070
** 0.036  [2619] 
  P-value on test of equal coefficients  [0.536] [0.110]    
Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the PUMA level.  Each specification is a single OLS regression in which Ln PUMA earnings 
and Ln household income are interacted with an exhaustive set of dummies.  All regressions also include as controls the uninteracted set of 
dummy variables as well as the same controls as the baseline regression reported in table 1, column 1.  In wave 1, respondents were asked how 
often they “spend a social evening” with various types of people while in wave 2 they were asked how often they “get together socially” with 
these types of people. The number of observations in each category is denoted between square brackets.  Frequency of social contacts is the 
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(1) Unrestricted Interaction   
   Ln Predicted PUMA Earnings of neighbors with: 
  Own Education  Less than college  College or more 
      Less than College  -0.284   (0.225)  0.017   (0.305) 
      College or more  -0.069   (0.201)  -0.402   (0.304) 
      
 Adjusted  R
2 0.0249 
 N  7523 
      
      
(2) Restricted Interaction   
   Ln Predicted PUMA Earnings of neighbors with: 
  Own Education  Less than college  College or more 
     Less than College  -0.316
 * (0.190)  -0.048  (0.176) 
     College or more  -0.048  (0.176)  -0.316
 * (0.190) 
      
 Adjusted  R
2 0.0251 
 N  7523 
  
Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the PUMA level.  All regressions also include as controls the uninteracted variables as well 
as the same controls as the baseline regression reported in table 1, column 1.  The sample is limited to the baseline sample for which the 
respondent and his or her spouse both have non-missing values for educational attainment. 
 